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actions, and if, for example, the side-effects were not part of the intentions,
then should something untoward happen and the agent need to revise his
plan, the intentions could not perform the very guidance role for which they
are required.
To be sure, such information must be in some way encoded and retained by
the agent for possible use. But it seems to me that there is no reason why this
information must be retained at the personal level at all; it may be hard-wired
in, and be potentially accessible to the agent in certain circumstances. But if
intentions are to be placed at the personal level, there is then no argument for
over-inflating the size of intentions themselves to contain such information.
The song says that Casey’s mind was so loaded that it nearly exploded. Enç’s
account of action seems to me to have Casey’s problem.







Decisions, Uncertainty, and the Brain, by Paul W. Glimcher. Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003, Pp. xx + 375. H/b £25.50.
This book aims to give a new framework for neuroscience by banishing the
concept of the reflex and making an economic model central to explanations
of the behaviour of organisms and their components. I very much doubt that
it accomplishes these aims, but along the way some interesting issues are
raised.
The first half of the book is a lively history of attempts to explain complex
actions in simple terms, from Descartes to connectionism. I will not discuss
this, as the material is familiar and no really new points are made. Glimcher
sees psychology as having been saddled from the beginning with a contrast
between simple actions, which are to be explained in terms of simple mechan-
ical processes, culminating in Sherrington’s description of the reflex, and com-
plex psychological processes, which are to be explained in completely different
ways which might be exempt from causal determination. He believes that the
concept of a reflex is not simply of limited application but is in fact a bad idea,
of explanatory value for no behaviour. The claim seems to be that there are no
reflexes. To support this claim he describes a wealth of phenomena, in particu-
lar reafference phenomena, which require essentially more complex explana-
tions, and then leaves the argument in suspension while he says what he takes
to be really going on. 
What is really going on is that individual components of the nervous sys-
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tem, down to single cells, are computing expected utility. The essential point is
that all aspects are probabilistic. What is important about the input to a neural
module is the information it carries about objective probabilities which, com-
bined with the aims of the module as part of the organism’s attempt to achieve
maximum reproductive fitness, lead it to produce the output which will maxi-
mize the expected value that the function of the module will be achieved. The
assumption that organisms and their components do operate optimally, so
that we can predict that the output will be the maximizing one, is defended
with a number of examples, ignoring the numerous contrary cases. Glimcher
cites studies from his own and other laboratories in which single cell record-
ings show that the firing of individual cells in the parietal cortex is propor-
tional to the likelihood that that particular cell’s activity will be conducive to a
beneficial outcome, given the probabilities of possible states as given by recent
inputs. I do not think Glimcher is really claiming that individual cells do the
utility calculations, though he sometimes gives this impression. The claim
must be that given a single cell we can always assume that its connections with
others are such that somewhere in the system the calculation occurs and the
cell’s output is affected accordingly. 
In one experiment the output is not optimal. Glimcher and colleagues
induced single cells to behave in accord with Herrnstein’s matching law, in
which pigeons press either of two levers in a proportion that matches the
rewardingness of that lever. However, in Glimcher’s set-up, unlike Herrn-
stein’s, this matching behaviour is not optimal. Glimcher promises an explana-
tion of this deviation and then does not explicitly supply it. I take it that his
explanation is bound up with the other major component of his theory, which
is the strategicality of all behaviour. Glimcher points out that in many compet-
itive or predator–prey situations it is important for animals not to be predicta-
ble. It is thus in their interest to produce the mixed strategies of game theory,
in which what is chosen is not a single act but a probability distribution over
acts. As a result, much animal behaviour will be deeply probabilistic: under the
same circumstances a different action will sometimes be produced. Glimcher
sees this aspect as permeating neural activity, so that outputs at all levels are
probabilistic, with the probabilities those of mixed strategies for the game-the-
oretical situations the animal or neural module is in. In game theory, though,
mixed strategies are optimal; Glimcher does not explain either why the output
of organisms and cells is sometimes probabilistic when a certain outcome
would have been optimal, nor what the analogues of strategic interaction for
components of a nervous system are.
The rhetoric in the second half of the book is that the attempt to demarcate
simple from complex behaviour should be replaced by explanations of neuro-
psychological phenomena in terms of ‘economic theory’. By economic theory
Glimcher means utility maximization and Bayes’s theorem, plus a pinch of
game theory. One conclusion he derives is that perception and decision-mak-
ing are distinct processes, in which the former is subject to an allocation of
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resources determined by the likelihood that a discrimination is going to be
crucial, while the latter proceeds with strict optimality. No doubt there are
many situations in which an organism has to allocate resources carefully in
order to obtain the data it needs to choose actions, and then can make a
straightforward choice. But there are also situations in which decision-making
is costly, and an organism has to distribute resources between easy and
approximate procedures and harder but more accurate procedures, in accord-
ance with the importance of the decision. I would be surprised if principles of
resource allocation did not permeate decision-making processes just as thor-
oughly as they do perceptual ones.
I am convinced by very little in this book. In fact no behaviour of any
organism is ever absolutely optimal. Birds do not get mortgages to afford safer
nests. An act is optimal relative to specific alternatives subject to constraints on
what is possible for the organism. A very delicate business. This is not to say
that searching for Bayesian updating and utility maximization in animal
behaviour and nervous systems is a bad idea. On the contrary, it is a deep and
powerful tool: but we are still waiting for the general framework that makes
clear when it is appropriate and what kinds of explanations it gives. One thing
it definitely does not do is to resolve issues about determinism, as Glimcher
claims in his last chapter. Clockwork automata can produce mixed strategies.
Nor does it banish the concept of the reflex, even if it deserves to be banished.
Organisms with reflexes can maximize expected utility and update their prob-
abilities. 
I do not want to end on such a sour note. Glimcher may indeed have assem-
bled some of the materials for a new neuroscientific paradigm. There are many
very thought-provoking discussions of attention and decision at different lev-
els of the nervous system. We may eventually see that Glimcher was leading us
in the right direction. But should hesitate before saying what that direction is.
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Nature From Within: Gustav Theodor Fechner and His Psycho-
physical Worldview, by Michael Heidelberger, translated by Cynthia Klohr.
Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2004. Pp. viii + 446. H/b $49.95.
An unscientific survey of American philosophers suggests that most have not
heard of Gustav Theodor Fechner (1801–87), and those who have know him
mainly as the crazy pantheist who founded the science of psychophysics.
